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CASES NOTED

ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE-LIMITATIONS ON
SABBATINO: NON-APPLICABILITY OF THE
HICKENLOOPER AMENDMENT
The sole stockholder of a Cuban corporation fled to the United
States after confiscation of his company by the Castro Government, and
thereafter became assignee of the corporation president's power of attorney. Later he brought an action against a Florida corporation to
recover a sum owed the Cuban corporation for tobacco sold to the
Florida corporation prior to Castro's takeover in Cuba. The United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida entered summary judgment dismissing the complaint, on the grounds that to assume
jurisdiction would be a violation of the Act of State Doctrine as recently
defined by the Supreme Court of the United States. On appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, held, reversed:
Where the Cuban government did not specifically prohibit the manner
in which the plaintiff corporation attempted to collect the sum owed
to it, the Act of State Doctrine was no bar to the suit. TabacaleraSeveriano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1968).
The resurging importance of the Act of State Doctrine in the field
of international law is due in no small part to the Castro takeover in
Cuba.' Not since the Nazi confiscations in Germany during the late
nineteen thirties and early nineteen forties has this principle played such
2
a prominent part in international law and conflicts of law litigation.
1. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Calderone v. Naviera
Vacuba S/A, 325 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1963) ; Pons v. Republic of Cuba, 294 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir.
1961); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank of New York, 270 F. Supp.
1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); Blanco v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 221 F. Supp. 219 (S.D. Fla. 1963); Mann v.
Compania Petrolera Trans-Cuba, S.A., 32 Misc. 2d 790, 223 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1962).
2. All over the world, political and social upheavals preceding, and caused by, the
two world wars have created legal problems connected with confiscations (expropriations without adequate compensation) or other expropriations of private property
by foreign governments.
A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 48 (1962).
Calling the Act of State Doctrine a principle of international law is, of course, technically
incorrect. "[Tihis doctrine is a conflict of laws rule applied by American courts; it is not a
rule of international law." Bayitch, Florida and InternationalLegal Developments 1962-1963,

18 U. MiAMI L. REV. 321, 345 (1963). The view is also expressed in the 1962 Proposed
Official Draft of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States that the
Act of State Doctrine is a rule of Conflict of Laws.
The proper use of the term, however, is not at issue and will not be discussed here.
Throughout this paper the writer wll refer to the Act of State Doctrine in the same manner
as did Judge Tuttle in his opinion. The following passage is quite ample for purposes of this
casenote:
[Diecisions affording recognition to the effect of foreign decrees on property situated
within the territory of the legislating state at the time of the execution of the decree
may be regarded as being based on the principle of the law of conflict of laws ....
This principle legitimately may be viewed as a reflection, on the municipal level, of
the principle of territorial sovereignty in international law.
Comment, InternationalLaw, Conflict Law and Sabbatino, 19 U. MIAmIn L. REv. 216, 223-24
(1964).
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The most important recent case dealing with the Act of State Doctrine
is Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,3 a controversial decision which
generated considerable comment both in and out of print.4 Sabbatino
defines the Act of State Doctrine as follows:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of ...another done within its

own territory. 5
This tenet is traditionally applied in cases where the legality of acts
of foreign states have occasion to be questioned in American courts of
law.
The comprehensiveness of the above rule of law is beginning to be
offset by various exceptions, however, imposed both judicially6 and legislatively.7 The primary importance of the case noted herein, Tabacalera
Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co.,8 is that it sets a practical
limit on the universal application of the Sabbatinorule.
The Act of State Doctrine is one of the oldest principles in our
system of Anglo-American jurisprudence. 9 The Supreme Court noted
in Sabbatino that the Doctrine can be traced back to the case of Blad
v. Blamfield,' ° decided in 1674. It was first enunciated in its modern
3. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
4. Collinson, Sabbatino: The Treatment of InternationalLaw in United States Courts, 3
CoLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 27 (1964); Falk, The Complexity of Sabbatino, 58 Am. J.
INT'L L. 935 (1964); Kline, An Examination of the Competence of National Courts to
Prescribe and Apply InternationalLaw-the Sabbatino Case Revisited, 1 U. SAN FRANCISCO
L. REV. 49 (1966); Reeves, The Sabbatino Case and the Sabbatino Amendment: Comedyor Tragedy-of Errors, 20 VAND. L. REV. 429 (1966); Sisul, Nationalization: A Changing
Concept in InternationalLaw, 6 ILL. CONTINUING LEGAL EDuc. 109 (1968).
5. 376 U.S. at 416.
6. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) ; Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968) ; Republic of Iraq v.
First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966) ; Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 270 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); F. Palicio y
Compania v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
7. Foreign Assistance Act § 301(d)4, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)2 (1964), popularly known as
the Hickenlooper Amendment or the Sabbatino Amendment.
8. 392 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1968).
9. Ehrenzweig is of the opinion that the Doctrine can be traced to Bartolus' TRAcTATus
REPRAESSALIUM, written in 1354. A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 48,
n.19 (1962).
It has also been said that:
The original common law meaning of "act of state" or "matter of state" referred to
acts of the forum sovereign pursued beyond the territorial bounds of England. Such
acts were immune to review by domestic English courts. Thus the common law usage
of the "act of state" doctrine concerned acts of a state which would not be reviewed
by the courts of the same state.
Kline, supra note 4, at 101.
10. 3 Swans. 604, 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (1674). With due respect to the Supreme Court, this
should probably be Blad's Case, 3 Swans. 603, 36 Eng. Rep. 991 (1674). Blad v. Blamfield
concerned the issue of whether a perpetual injunction to stay an alien's suit at law could be
granted by an English court. Blad's Case concerned the question whether the confiscation of
an Englishman's property in Denmark should be given effect in England. It was said:
[F]or whatever was law in Denmark, would be law in England in this case, and

1968]

CASES NOTED

form in the case of Underhill v. Hernandez,11 and reaffirmed in three
other cases decided within the next two decades. 2 These four cases are
frequently cited as the basis for the Act of State Doctrine as it is defined
in the United States. Its present form is virtually unchanged from that
in which it was first delineated in Underhill.
After the period from 1897 to 1918, very few cases dealing with
the Act of State Doctrine were decided in this country until the periods
immediately before and after World War 1II 3 Thereafter, it was practically laid to rest until Castro's revolution in 1959 brought about another
flurry of international claims. A comprehensive determination by the
Supreme Court as to rights and liabilities arising out of the Cuban
situation was inevitable;' 4 thus the great importance of Banco Nacional
5
de Cuba v. Sabbatino.1
In re-establishing the Doctrine as it was first laid down in Underhill
v. Hernandez over seventy years ago, the Supreme Court said:
None of this Court's subsequent cases in which the act of
state doctrine was directly or peripherally involved manifest
any retreat from Underhill.... On the contrary in two of these
cases ... the doctrine as announced in Underhill was reaffirmed
in unequivocal terms.' 6
The English courts have not paralleled ours in the development of
the Act of State Doctrine. At first it seemed they would do so; Underhill
and Oetjen v. Central Leather Co. 17 were both mentioned approvingly
in an important English case.' The recent decision of Anglo-Iranian Oil
would be allowed as a very good justification in the action: but if the wrong were
done without colour of authority, it was fit to be questioned ....
3 Swans. at 604,
36 Eng. Rep. at 992 (emphasis by the court).
11. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
12. Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) ; Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
13. Most of the early cases dealt with Communist confiscations in Russia. See, e.g.,
Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 286, 20 N.E.2d 758
(1939); Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369, 189 N.E. 456 (1934); M.
Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933).
For later cases see Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) ; Zwack v. Kraus Bros. & Co.,
93 F. Supp. 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) ; Eastern States Petroleum Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp.,
28 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); The Navemar, 18 F. Supp. 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1937).
14. The Supreme Court noted in Sabbatino that no fewer than thirty-five cases were
awaiting the outcome of the decision.
15. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
16. 376 U.S. 398, 416. Compare Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 506 (1941):
It is "rudimentary" that a state "will not lend the aid of its courts to enforce a contract founded upon a foreign law where to do so would be repugnant to good morals,
would lead to disturbance and disorganization of the municipal law, or in other
words, violate the public policy of the State where the enforcement of the foreign
contract is sought."
17. 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
18. Arksionairnoye Obschestvo Dlia Mechanicheskoyi Obrabotky Diereva A. M. Luther v.
James Sagor & Co., 3 K.B. 532 (1921).
An interesting case is Wright v. Mutt, 1 H. BI. 136, 126 Eng. Rep. 83 (1788), concerning
litigation arising as a result of a law enacted by the Georgia Legislature shortly after the
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Co. v. Jaffrate,'9 however, demonstrates that the English courts have
given their Act of State Doctrine an interpretation and reorientation
which is not found in the United States. The difference is that although
the English courts may not sit in judgment on the acts of a foreign
government done within the borders of its own country, a particular
act is not an "act of state" if it violates English law, of which international law is a part.2" They are not bound to apply foreign law to
property which has at all times been within their jurisdiction. This interpretation is different from that of "act of state" in the American courts."
Had Sabbatino been decided in England there is a good probability that
it would have had an entirely different outcome.2 2
Courts in other countries seem to have adhered more closely to the
English rather than the American interpretation of the Act of State
Doctrine. 23 A desire on the part of American judges and legislators
to bring the interpretation of our Act of State Doctrine more into line
with that of other countries brought about further developments in the
Sabbatino series.24 These developments in turn laid the basis for the
decision in Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co.
The most important of these "backlash" developments is the socalled Hickenlooper Amendment,2" which was added to the Foreign
Declaration of Independence, which declared a confiscation of the properties of the Tory
governor. Since the case arose after the Revolution, the English court upheld the law as being
one of an independent country and as such entitled to respect.
19. 1 W.L.R. 246 (1953).
20. Id.; Snyder, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino: The Supreme Court Speaks, 16
SYRACUsE L. REV. 15 (1964).
21. But see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), which was the
final outcome of Sabbatino and in which the previous result was overturned due to the application of the recently-passed Hickenlooper Amendment. It was held-that the expropriation by
the Cuban government violated international law and that the Hickenlooper Amendment was
constitutional.
22. The Russian nationalization decrees have been held not to affect assets of Russian
corporations in England. In re Russian Bank For Foreign Trade, [1933J Ch. 745, held that
where a debt owing by a nationalized corporation is "locally situated" or "primarily recoverable" in England, it is not affected by Soviet nationalization decrees. To the same effect is
Sedgwick Collins & Co. v. Rossia Ins. Co., 1 K.B. 1 (1926), which held that the position of
creditors of a Russian corporation as against the property of such corporation located in
England, such as debts owing to it from Russian debtors, is not altered by the nationalization
decrees of the Russian government.
23. A Comment in 3 Am. J. Comp. L. 87 (1954), by Otto C. Sommerich, discusses 49
SJZ [1953, No. 18] 281 et seq. (Superior Court of the Canton of Zurich, Switzerland). In
that case the court held that confiscatory measures of another government, though recognized,
might be repudiated as contrary to the public policy of Switzerland; and that foreign measures, even if enacted by law, cannot be recognized by Swiss courts if vested rights are violated
thereby. The thesis that foreign confiscatory legislation has no extraterritorial effect is thus
upheld. Other cases, to the same effect, are discussed in the same comment.
24. The constant shifting back and forth between the terms "Sabbatino decision" and
"Act of State Doctrine" throughout this paper is not inadvertent. This writer believes the use
of the terms to be interchangeable. The Sabbatino decision was the complete American Act of
State Doctrine, prior to the enactment of the Hickenlooper Amendment.
25. Foreign Assistance Act § 301(d)4, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)2 (1964), as amended 79 Stat.
658 (1965).
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Assistance Act of 196426 because of congressional dissatisfaction with
the result in Sabbatino. The draftsmen of the Amendment made no
secret of the fact that their purpose was to overrule that portion of
Sabbatino which prohibited a court from taking jurisdiction over a
case because of the Act of State Doctrine.2 7 There were, however, three
instances where the Hickenlooper Amendment would not apply, and one
of these was that it had no effect when the case did not involve a
violation of international law. In deciding Tabacalera, Judge Tuttle's first
problem was to determine whether the case fell within this exception.
The plaintiff in Tabacalera was a Cuban citizen suing on the debt
of Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A., a confiscated Cuban corporation.
Confiscation without compensation by a state from its own nationals
is no violation of international law.2 The Hickenlooper Amendment
therefore did not apply to Tabacalera, and Sabbatino was still good
precedent. Had the Cuban government by law or decree prohibited the
plaintiff from bringing suit, the Act of State Doctrine would have
eliminated jurisdiction in the District Court.
This is one of the turning points on which Judge Tuttle based his
decision. The actual law by which the Cuban government purported
to confiscate Tabacalera was carefully analyzed and incorporated, word
for word, into the opinion. 9 Although couched in very broad terms, the
Cuban law did not actually cancel the power of attorney which had
been granted to the president of the corporation prior to confiscation,80
nor did it prohibit the assignment of that power after confiscation. As
stated in the opinion:
[T] hrough inadvertence, mistake or purposeful handling of this
account, the Cuban government did not actually, by any of its
official acts, interfere with the right of Tabacalera ...

to collect

this account in the manner in which the company sought to
pursue the remedy in the United States courts. .

.

. We see no

reason to create a further power of confiscation in the interventor than the government gave him."'
26. 22 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq. (1964), as amended 79 Stat. 653 (1965), 80 Stat. 796 (1966).
27. This, incidentally, radically changed the trend of prior decisions. The effect of Sabbatino was to overrule a number of cases which had previously been decided. See, e.g., Gonzalez
v. Industrial Bank (of Cuba), 12 N.Y.2d 33, 234 N.Y.S.2d 210, 186 N.E.2d 410 (1962);
Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, Nat'l Corp., 15 App. Div. 2d 111, 222 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1961);
American Jewish Congress v. Carter, 19 Misc. 2d 205, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
28. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Pons v. Republic of
Cuba, 294 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
The case of F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481, 487 (1966) held that:
[C]onfiscations by a state of the property of its own nationals, no matter how
flagrant and regardless of whether compensation has been provided, do not constitute
violations of international law.
29. 392 F.2d at 710, discussing Cuban Ministry of Labor Resolution No. 20260 (Sept. 15,
1960).
30. A copy of the document which granted the power of attorney had been attached to
the plaintiff's affidavit. See 392 F.2d at 707-8.
31. 392 F.2d at 714.
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Thus the plaintiff had an outstanding, unconditional power of attorney which had never been cancelled. 2 Nothing actually prohibited
him, as assignee, from bringing suit in Florida for collection of an
account due the corporation.
Still another problem had to be overcome, however, before the
defendant could be made to pay the money owed to the plaintiff Jorge
as assignee of the plaintiff Tabacalera. The court found that the plaintiffs
had the power to collect. However, could they do so in the face of the
Act of State Doctrine, which prohibited the Court from interfering with
an act done by a foreign state within its own borders? The situs of the
res, which in this case was an intangible chose in action, became of
vital importance; for if the situs was considered to be within the
borders of Cuba, as it was in Sabbatino, the court of appeals would
have no jurisdiction."3
In the past, the situs of an intangible has been held to be in different
places for different purposes.3 4 The law on this point, at least in Florida,
seems to be that intangible property accompanies the person of the
owner. 3 Judge Tuttle held in Tabacalerathat:
In attempting to fashion a rule fixing the situs of an indebtedness for the very limited purpose of deciding whether it is
"property within [Cuba's] own territory,"we find no compelling
requirement that we accept the fiction that the situs is irrevocably at the domicile of the creditor, a fiction sometimes used
for commercial purposes. For the purpose of our inquiry we
find this debt was not property in Cuba."6
32. Judge Tuttle states that the reason for this was that the interventor probably did not
know anything about it. 392 F.2d at 714. Be that as it may, the plaintiff did have the power

to collect.
33. 392 F.2d at 713:

The really important point of difference between the facts of this case and that
of Sabbatino is that the subject of the confiscation in the latter case was a ship's
cargo of sugar which was present in the territorial waters of Cuba-tangible personal
property-whereas in the case before us the subject of the alleged "taking" by the

government of Cuba is a credit owed to the Cuban corporation . . . by an American
creditor domiciled in Tampa, Florida.
For cases where the Doctrine has been applied see Compania Ron Bacardi, S.A. v. Bank
of Nova Scotia, 193 F. Supp. 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New
York & Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 286, 20 N.E.2d 758 (1939) ; Menzel v. List, 49 Misc. 2d 300, 267
N.Y.S.2d 804 (1966); Mann v. Compania Petrolera Trans-Cuba, S.A., 32 Misc. 2d 790, 223
N.Y.S.2d 900 (Sup. Ct. 1962).

In Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 1027 (1966), the Republic of Iraq sought to recover a bank account and stock held
in New York by the late King Faisal II. A successful coup in Iraq had resulted in the confiscation of all the king's property. The Court said:
Under the traditional application of the act of state doctrine, the principle of
judicial refusal of examination applies only to a taking by a foreign sovereign of
property within its own territory .

...

34. 392 F.2d at 714-15. See also Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1938) ; Farmer's Loan
& Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930); Chicago Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Sturm,
174 U.S. 710 (1899).
35. Beverly Beach Properties, Inc. v. Nelson, 68 So.2d 604 (Fla. 1953).
36. 392 F.2d at 716.

1968]

CASES NOTED

That the situs of the debt was held to be here in the United States
could very easily have been anticipated, due to the lack of any contrary
precedents upon which the Court could rely. It has long been the policy
of the courts to decide the situs of intangible property on the basis of
their concept of justice, rather than on any hard and fast rule of law."
Nor is the fact that the Court found the outstanding power of
attorney to be valid very surprising; this, too, is a matter which was
decided at the judge's discretion and by his innate sense of justice.
The greatest importance of Tabacalera is that it sets a tentative
limit to the Sabbatino decision, even without the use of the Hickenlooper
Amendment. The purpose of the Amendment is to protect American
citizens from confiscations of their property by hostile foreign governments;" it makes no mention of foreign creditors who seek relief, in
American courts, from confiscatory decrees imposed by their own
governments. The practical effect of Tabacalera is to fill a gap which
Sabbatino had opened but which the Hickenlooper Amendment had not
completely closed.
If for no other reason than that it prevents unjust enrichment, this
writer believes the Tabacalera decision to be a sound one. A contrary
result would not seem to further the concept of justice as it should exist
in American courts. Permitting a debtor to refuse to pay a bona fide
foreign creditor who is here in the United States, and yet at the same
time discouraging him from sending that same debt to the foreign country
on the grounds that it is against public policy to trade with unfriendly
nations, is a philosophy which should not be sanctioned by any court
of law.
GEORGE

R.

HARPER

UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE-SETOFF OF AMOUNTS
PAYABLE UNDER MEDICAL PAYMENTS COVERAGE
The plaintiff-insured was involved in a collision with a negligently
operated uninsured vehicle. The defendant-insurer had issued to the plaintiff a policy which included both medical payment and uninsured motorist
endorsements, but specifically excepted from payment under the latter
coverage amounts paid or payable under the former. The plaintiff sought
a declaratory judgment to determine whether the setoff provision con37. Needless to say, the problems inherent in determining the location of intangibles
will, in many cases, enable the forum to reach virtually any result of its choosing.
A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 48, 172 (1962). See also § 242 of
the same work.
38. The legislative history of the Hickenlooper Amendment leaves no doubt that it intends for international law to require compensation for confiscated American property. See S.
REP. No. 170, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 19; 110 CONG. REc. 18936-37, 18946 (1964); 110 CONG.
REC. App. A5157 (1964).

